BACKGROUND-AIM:
Tobacco Industry Interference (TII) continues to undermine the effective implementation of public health policies worldwide. In Poland, where the tobacco sector maintains a strong economic and political presence, monitoring industry influence is essential for safeguarding compliance with Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This study aims to assess the extent of tobacco industry interference in public policy in Poland between March 2023 and March 2025 and evaluate the government’s response to such interference.

METHODS:
The analysis is based on the 2025 TII Index methodology developed by the Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA). The assessment uses 20 indicators grouped into seven domains of interference, covering industry participation in policy development, corporate social responsibility (CSR), benefits to the industry, unnecessary interactions, transparency, conflict of interest and preventive measures. Data were obtained from public sources, including legislation, government records, media reports, official registers and social media. Three independent reviewers conducted evidence searches, and all scores were agreed upon jointly to ensure consistency.

RESULTS:
Poland scored 59 points in the 2025 Index (lower score indicates better protection from industry interference), showing only marginal progress compared with 2023 (62 points). Evidence indicates persistent influence of the tobacco industry in several policy areas. The government accepted industry input on legislative timelines, resulting in extended vacatio legis for new tobacco regulations. High-level government officials held undisclosed meetings with industry executives during ongoing legislative processes. British American Tobacco received over PLN 8.9 million in state energy subsidies during 2023–2024. Industry CSR activities continue, although cooperation with public institutions has decreased, shifting focus to private-sector partnerships. Conflict of interest cases were documented, including employment of former tobacco executives in public institutions. Preventive measures remain weak: Poland lacks a code of conduct for public officials on interactions with the tobacco industry and has no system to implement FCTC Article 5.3 safeguards.

CONCLUSIONS:
Tobacco industry interference remains a serious obstacle to effective tobacco control in Poland. Despite small improvements, government protection from industry influence is insufficient and largely reactive. To comply with WHO FCTC Article 5.3, Poland should establish transparent procedures for interactions with the tobacco industry, prohibit policy partnerships, introduce conflict-of-interest safeguards, and end reliance on industry-funded research on illicit trade. Stronger institutional independence is needed to protect public health policymaking from commercial interests.