BACKGROUND-AIM:
Spain’s 1998 tobacco liberalization of its state-owned tobacco monopoly established the Tobacco Market Commission (TMC) and an Advisory Council (AC), formally integrating the industry. While the founding Law 13/1998 initially excluded health matters, subsequent decrees empowered the AC to advise on health policies, assigning the industry seven seats compared to the Health Ministry’s one. This structure contradicts WHO FCTC Article 5.3, which requires insulating health policy from commercial interests. This study examines how industry representatives leveraged this position to influence Spanish tobacco control policies between 2023 and 2024.

METHODS:
A qualitative document analysis was conducted on all 22 official AC meeting minutes recorded from January 2023 to December 2024, which were obtained through a transparency request. From these records, researchers selected 29 written statements submitted by industry members that demonstrated clear argumentative intent to influence policy debates. These statements were systematically coded to identify political strategies of interference, using the Policy Dystopia Model as a guide. The analysis categorized statements by their intent to obstruct or delay policy, manage unfavorable information, claim entitlement to participate in policy discussions, or threaten legal action.

RESULTS:
Of the 29 statements analyzed, ADELTA, the association representing tobacco manufacturers, originated the majority (n=21). The most frequently identified strategy was obstructing or delaying policy implementation, particularly regarding the introduction of plain packaging (14 statements). Other observed tactics included managing unfavorable information to deny policy benefits or highlight economic costs (seven statements), asserting a right to participate in policy discussions (five statements), and making veiled threats of legal action, such as claims of trademark expropriation (two statements). These strategies coincided with significant policy setbacks, including the removal of plain packaging from a draft Royal Decree and the renewal of the TMC statute without altering the AC’s composition.

CONCLUSIONS:
The tobacco industry exploited its institutionalized role on the AC as a “Trojan horse” to actively subvert public health policies, directly contravening Spain’s obligations under the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Article 5.3. This legally sanctioned position creates a clear, direct channel for policy interference, allowing industry to transform a market administration body into a tool for weakening tobacco control measures. Urgent reforms are necessary to insulate public health policymaking from vested commercial interests, specifically by amending the TMC statute to explicitly remove the AC’s mandate related to public health.